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28. William
H. HARTSHORN17 was
born about 1830 in Ohio (?). He died on 8 Feb 1865 in Mud Springs,
Nebraska Territory. He was buried in Ft. Laramie, Wyoming. Remain
disintered and removed to Ft. McPherson, Neb.. Enlisted in army 19
Oct 1861 as a private. He was mustered into Company C, 11th Ohio Cavalry and
served in the Nebraska Territory and fought in Indian battles. He was killed
at battle of Mud Springs (Rush Creek) on 8 Feb 1865. His body was recovered containing
97 arrows.
The entire account reads as follows:
LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN SUB-DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA,
Fort Laramie, Nebr. Ter., February 15, 1865.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that about 4 o'clock on the evening of
Saturday, the 4th instant, I was informed by telegraph that Mud Springs, a telegraph
station 105 miles east of Fort Laramie, was attacked by Indians. There were at
Mud Springs Station at that time nine soldiers and five citizens, one of time
latter connected with the telegraph company and the others herding stock in the
vicinity for Messrs. Creighton and Hoel. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Ellsworth,
commanding Company H, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, then at Camp Mitchell,
a post fifty miles east of Fort Laramie and fifty-five miles west of Mud Springs,
to proceed without delay, with all the men he could spare, to the relief of Mud
Springs Station; to travel all night, and if possible reach there by morning.
He obeyed the order promptly, and was at Mud Springs by daylight the morning
of the 5th, with thirty-six men, making the distance in twelve hours without
stopping. In the meantime I left Fort Laramie about 7 p.m. of the 4th instant,
with about 120 men, consisting of detachments of different detachments of the
Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry and part of Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry Volunteers,
being all that could be mounted and spared from Fort Laramie. My command traveled
all night and reached Camp Mitchell during the forenoon of the 5th instant. The
night was severely cold and several men were so much frozen as to be unable to
proceed any further. After a short rest I took twenty-five men and went rapidly
forward, reaching Mud Springs about 2 o'clock the morning of the 6th instant.
The balance of the command followed under Captain Fouts, Seventh Iowa Cavalry,
and reached Mud Springs about 8 o'clock the same morning, having made 105 miles
in thirty-six hours, including stoppages. The small party with me made the same
distance in seventeen hours, actual travel, and thirty hours, including the delay
at Camp Mitchell. I found that the Indians had been in great numbers on Pole
Creek on the 3d instant; that on the 4th they began to appear about Mud Springs,
attacked the station, stole the stock there, consisting of about 15 ponies and
horses belonging to citizens, 1 mule and 3 horses belonging to the Government;
also the cattle herd of Messrs. Creighton and Hoel, which was on Rankin's Creek
about four miles distant; that on the morning of the 5th, soon after the arrival
of Lieutenant Ellsworth, they had appeared around Mud Springs in large numbers,
seemed surprised at the increase of men at the station, and after a little firing
their attack ceased, but many continued in sight on the hills all day. At daylight
on the morning of the 6th instant they began to come over the bluffs from all
directions, and about the time of the arrival of the main body they commenced
a desultory firing and made efforts to cut off some of the party coming in. It
was evident that they had come to take the post and expected to do so. The men
and stock were fatigued by night travel, all chilled and many frost-bitten. The
station is also utterly indefensible, being surrounded by hills and knolls full
of gullies, enabling the Indians to ambush and creep upon us at points where
they could not be reached by a cavalry charge. Shortly after our main body got
in they attacked us in force and with great boldness. The suddenness of the attack,
the condition of the men, and the character of the ground interfered with proper
discipline and system on our part, and the fighting at first was rather miscellaneous.
We found it necessary to imitate the Indians, get under banks and creep up to
favorable positions, watch for an Indian's head, shoot the moment it was shown,
and pop down at the flash of his gun. The men got quite handy at this game and
soon made any ground occupied by the Indians too hot for them. It was common
to see a soldier and an Indian playing bo-peep in this manner for half an hour
at a time. At one time there were some 200 Indians behind a hill and in its ravines,
where they could come within seventy-five yards of the buildings at the station.
From this point arrows came in showers, the Indians shooting them keeping entirely
out of sight. The arrows were apparently discharged at an angle of about forty-five
degrees, making a curve and descending upon us at about the same angle. Many
horses and mules and some men were wounded in this manner. It became evident
that this point must be cleared, and arrangements were made for two parties to
charge, one on foot to drive them out, the other on horseback to head them off,
when the Indians, finding half a dozen rifles leveled at each head that was shown,
abandoned this position. We immediately took possession of it, dug a rifle-pit
on the highest point, and had no more trouble from that quarter. After about
four hours' fighting, we began to press them back in all directions and soon
drove them off.
About 2 o'clock their fire slackened and they withdrew into the hills, but many
continued in sight on the bluffs until dark. In this day's fight we had seven
wounded, three of them seriously, and some horses and mules killed. The loss
of the Indians must have been at least thirty in this engagement. Most of the
officers and men estimate it to be much greater. It is impossible, however, to
be certain, as their dead and wounded are immediately carried off; indeed, it
is common for the warrior to be fastened to his horse so that his body will be
brought off in case of accident. The number of warriors engaged was from 500
to 1,000, the latter probably nearer the mark. They were armed with rifles, revolvers,
bows and arrows. Many were mounted on American horses and there were white men
or Mexicans among them. They had plenty of ammunition. Minie-balls were common,
and they were bold and brave. They generally shot too high, else we should have
suffered much more. Early in the engagement I telegraphed to Maj. Thomas L. Mackey,
commanding at Fort Laramie, to send down a field piece, it appearing difficult
to dislodge the Indians from their sheltered positions without one. Directly
afterward the line was cut. About 3 o'clock I sent a strong party to repair it.
The break was found about a mile west and mended. Soon afterward it was cut again.
At dark another party was sent out and found two poles cut down and the wire
gone for four poles at or near the same place. By taking wire from the line east
it was repaired, so that we were able to keep up communication with Fort Laramie.
During the night we fortified and prepared to take the offensive. In the morning
no Indians were in sight. Leaving Captain Fouts in command of the station, we
reconnoitered in force ready to meet them and found the whole country covered
with trails. They seemed to concentrate and tend generally toward the springs
on Brush Creek about ten miles distant, and we satisfied ourselves that their
main camp was there. Before daylight of the morning of the 8th, Lieut. W.H. Brown,
Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, arrived with a howitzer, having come from Fort
Laramie in thirty-four hours including stoppages. On the morning of the 8th an
expedition was organized for pursuit. Captain Fouts being left in command of
the station. The country is very broken and in Indian fighting an attempt to
surprise is always probable. The camp was found where we expected, at Rush Creek
Springs. It was deserted, but there were evidences that it had been recently
and hastily left; that they had been there about three days and were in great
numbers. The camp covered several miles. Over 100 beef-cattle had been slaughtered
in it. Empty oyster, meat, and fruit cans were plenty. Flour sacks, a quantity
of codfish, and indications of the spoils of ranches and trains were scattered
everywhere. Quantities of meat cut up for use and skins pegged down for drying
and tanning were left upon the ground. Pressing forward on the now fresh trails,
in four or five miles we reached the valley of the Platte, near the mouth of
Rush Creek. When within a mile of the river we came in sight of the Indians on
the other side scattered over the plains between the bluffs and the river, grazing
their horses. There were no tepees or lodges, no travois or lodge poles, no women,
children, or dogs in sight. They had all gone forward into the bluffs which at
this point are about five miles north of the river, leaving the warriors only
behind. The lodge trails were very broad and fresh, apparently made that morning
and the evening before.
It was now clear we had underestimated the numbers against us. With a field-glass
they could be distinctly seen and examined. There were at least 2,000 warriors
in sight. It was evident that all the hostile Indians that had been committing
depredations and holding the country along the South Platte were concentrated
here. The river was about half a mile wide and frozen over. While we were looking
for a crossing they saved us the trouble by commencing to swarm down to the river-banks
and come over on the ice, not opposite, but one or two miles above and below
us. We had barely time to corral our train before they were upon us on every
side. The position chosen was the best we could get, but there were many little
sand ridges and hollows under cover of which they could approach us. A very great
change had come over the men since the morning of the fight at Mud Springs. They
were rested and free from excitement, had confidence in their officers, obeyed
orders, and went to work with a will. Sharpshooters were pushed out, and the
hillocks commanding the camp occupied, and rifle-pits dug upon them. The Indians
of the plains are the best skirmishers in the world. In rapidity of movement,
suddenly wheeling and hanging over steep and difficult ground, no trained cavalry
can equal them. Hunting the buffalo is the best possible school. We were not
strong enough to charge or scatter. It was necessary to be prudent, and at first
take the defensive. They dashed up very boldly, but soon fell back from our bullets,
and resorted to their old game of skulking and sharpshooting. At this game they
were well met by our men. At one point we were greatly annoyed by a party of
ten or fifteen behind a little knoll about 400 yards distant, and it became evident
they must be dislodged. A detail was made of sixteen mounted men, part from the
detachment of Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and part from a detachment of
the First Battalion, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry. The party was placed in
command of Lieutenant Patton, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and he was ordered
to charge at full speed, revolvers in hand, to clear out the Indians behind the
hillock, and, having done so, wheel and return immediately. It was admirably
done; the skulkers were routed and fled. In the meantime there were from 150
to 200 Indians on the rising ground beyond the contested hillock, which was about
midway between us and them. When they saw the charge they swarmed down to save
their men, and our party had a short hand-to-hand fight with their advance and
then wheeled and returned as ordered. In this charge we lost two men, Private
John A. Harris, Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, who fell in the fight, and Private
William H. Hartshorn, Company C, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, a veteran,
who was on a very spirited horse, and either his own ardor or inability to control
his horse or both, led him forward into the thickest of the Indians, and we saw
him no more alive. Many Indians were killed and wounded in this charge. They
fell immediately back before our fire as the charging party returned. A small
party immediately went out and brought in the body of Harris. The Indians had
no time to scalp him or take his arms or clothing, and they were brought in with
him. The body of Hartshorn was found next morning about one mile from
our camp, horribly mutilated, with ninety-seven arrows sticking in it. It is
not unlikely that some chief of note was killed by him, or some one else in the
charge, and that each one of his relations and friends put an arrow in him and
left it, as it is sometimes their custom. The bodies were brought to Fort Laramie
for burial. I desire especially to call attention to the conduct of Lieutenant
Patton and his little body of men. The charge was a very gallant one, and the
desired objects were fully accomplished. Toward night we could not bring the
Indians in reach of our fire. They retired behind the hills and were returning
across the Platte until dark, when very few seemed to be on the south side of
the river.
About sundown an incident worthy of notice occurred. Private Miller, Company
C, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, had shot an Indian, and he lay on the ice
in plain sight about half a mile distant. Our enemies retreating and night coming
on, horses and mules were ordered to be watered a few at a time, not in the river,
but at the creek, which was the nearer. A party going by mistake toward the Plattte,
where the dead Indian lay, cry was raised and the Indians on both sides came
flocking to the point, evidently supposing that we were after the body. Recall
was sounded, our men came back, and the Indians retired, but in the morning the
body was gone. The Indians never permit their killed to fall into the hands of
their enemies if it is possible to prevent it. We camped on the battle ground
and continued to prepare and occupy favorable positions during the night and
morning. About sunrise on the 9th they began to come over above and below, until
some 400 mounted warriors were counted, without any apparent diminution of the
number left on the north side of the river. They found us ready, skirmished about
for a while, exchanged a few shots, and then began to recross and put off rapidly
for the bluffs. At noon very few were to be seen. They were evidently hurrying
away into the sand hills to overtake their families that had gone on the day
before. A few scouts could be seen on the other side of the river, left to watch
us, and when we moved up the river we saw them, eight in number, crossing to
our deserted camp like wolves, to pick up something as a trophy or to dig up
or scalp any dead they might find. Further pursuit would have been injudicious
and useless. With their numbers they could at any time compel our small party
to corral and fight. We could drive them off and follow again with the same result,
but could not afford to give them the least advantage. In following them to L'Eau-qui-court
we should be in the sand hills, when they would have had greatly the advantage
in ground and where our stock could not subsist. In each engagement the Indians
fired everything around them that would burn. We continued to see the smoke of
their fires as they went north for at least fifty miles. We broke camp about
2 o'clock, moved up the Plattte about fifteen miles, where the command was divided,
part under Lieutenant Brown, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, going on to Camp
Mitchell and Fort Laramie, which had been left with insufficient garrisons, and
the remainder returning to Mud Springs with me. On the morning of the 10th I
took about seventy-five men and proceeded to Pole Creek, to open communication
with Julesburg.
At Pole Creek we met Captain Wilcox, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, with his command,
repairing the line. On the 11th we started to return to Fort Laramie. Made Pumpkin
Creek, ten miles west of Mud Springs, that night. On the 12th made Camp Mitchell,
forty-five miles, and on the 14th reached Fort Laramie, fifty miles. We found
the Pole Creek Station burned, and between that point and Mud Springs the poles
were gone for ten miles and a half, consecutively. East of Pole Creek Station
they were reported gone for a still greater distance. The Indians had evidently
good teachers and did their work well. They have got over their superstitious
idea that it is bad medicine to touch the telegraph. Of the conduct of the officers
and men connected with the expedition I cannot speak too highly. In extreme cold
weather, in the dead of winter, the main body marched nearly 400 miles in ten
days, much of the time by night, without tents or shelter, camped on the ground,
often without fire, on short rations and forage, and met and repulsed in every
engagement a brave and cunning foe, numbering at least ten, probably fifteen,
to one. Their patience and endurance, their cheerfulness and courage, their readiness
to obey, and promptness and skill to execute could not be surpassed. The expedition
was organized into four squadrons, the first composed of a detachment from Company
D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, officered by Captain Fouts and Lieutenant Haywood; the
second, of a detachment from Company I, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, officered
by Captain Apt, Lieutenants Harlan and Moloney; the third, of a detachment from
Company H, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Ellsworth;
the fourth, of a detachment composed of men from Companies A, B, C, and D, of
the First Battalion, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, officered by Lieutenants
Patton and Herriman; and the howitzer in charge of Lieutenant Brown, commanding
a squad of men, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, sufficient to man the piece.
Assistant Surgeon Zeigler, Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, accompanied the expedition.
Captains Glenn, regimental commissary, and Reeves, assistant district inspector,
both of the Eleventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, were also with it as volunteers
without command, being anxious to take part in an Indian fight, in which they
were fully gratified. Lieutenant Harlan acted as quartermaster and commissary,
and Lieutenants Herriman and Moloney as adjutants, the first at the commencement
of the expedition and the last at its close. All did their duty well and I do
not feel at liberty to particularize, except in the case of Lieutenant Patton
and his party. Their charge was a very brilliant affair; challenged and received
universal praise. Mr. Martin Hogan, telegraph operator, was employed as guide
and did valuable service. The howitzer, under command of Lieutenant Brown, was
admirably served, but did not prove as useful as was expected owing to the defective
character of the ammunition, many of the shells failing to burst at all and some
bursting at the muzzle of the gun. I append the report of Lieutenant Brown upon
the subject, and ask that proper steps be taken to condemn such of our ammunition
as is worthless or doubtful and that better be furnished to the troops stationed
in the mountains. Much of the howitzer ammunition at Fort Laramie has been in
the magazine for eight or ten years. All supplies for this service should be
of the best quality, as they are forwarded but once in the year and mistakes
cannot be seasonably corrected. The casualties attending the expedition were
much fewer than could have been anticipated. It arises from the fact that the
Indians, when near us, fired too high, not understanding their new arms and ammunition,
and that our men obeyed orders, fought systematically, and manifested great prudence
and adroitness in imitating the Indian cunning. Moving and fighting in the Indian
country is a distinct branch of the service that few understand and that can
only be learned by actual service.
In the engagement at Mud Springs 3 men were wounded seriously and 4 slightly.
In the battle at the mouth of Rush Creek 2 men were killed, 9 wounded. In addition
to this, 10 men were seriously frostbitten in our night marches, making a total
of 28 killed and disabled. The toted loss of the Indians in all the engagements
is variously estimated from 100 to 150. I append the report of Asst. Surg. A.F.
Zeigler, and as to casualties also his supplemental report, detailing the brutalities
inflicted upon the body of Private W. H. Hartshorn, Company C. It is well
to know the character of the enemy we have to deal with. This party of Indians
has rarely been equaled in size. It is usually difficult for large numbers to
remain long together for lack of subsistence, but in this case their stolen stock
and plundered stores furnished them abundant supplies. The party was made up
of all the Cheyennes, Ogalallas, and Brule Sioux south of the Platte, together
with probably a few Kiowas, Arapahoes, and perhaps some straggling Apaches and
Comanches. It numbered from 800 to 1,000 lodges and from 2,000 to 3,000
warriors. The last-named bands are most likely on and south of the Arkansas River
for the winter, but many come up to depredate on the main and South Platte when
grass comes. The party we met has no doubt gone north to the Powder River country,
to join the hostile Indians there, and may be expected to continue their depredations
along the North Platte till severely punished. Their probable route from where
we left them will be through the sand hills to L'Eau-qui-court, then across the
heads of White River and the South Fork of Cheyenne to Powder River. Small parties
may remain but the main body will go there to secure their families and recruit
their stock until spring. They are well armed and mounted; have many rifled muskets
and plenty of ammunition, including minie cartridges with ounce balls; are full
of venom, and bent on revenge for the loss of their people south. So soon as
they reach the Indians north they will excite and perhaps compel them to become
hostile. The posts on the Platte, especially Deer Creek and Platte Bridge, which
are within 100 miles of Powder River, will be in immediate danger. More troops
should be sent out here immediately to hold the posts in the sub-district, and
when spring opens important expeditions should be organized to penetrate the
center of their country.
Having been nearly three years in this service and being about to leave it, I
venture to add a word as to the policy to be pursued. I beg to repeat the suggestions
which I have heretofore made, that the permanent cure, for the hostilities of
the northern Indians is to go into the heart of their buffalo country and build
and hold forts till the trouble is over. A hasty expedition however successful,
is only a temporary lesson, whereas the presence of troops in force in the country
where the Indians are compelled to live and subsist would soon oblige them to
sue for peace and accept such terms as the Government may think proper to impose.
The Black Hills, Big Horn Mountain, Yellowstone country, are all rich in minerals,
but this wealth cannot be made available while hostile bands of Indians are roaming
over the country. If these Indians could be induced to remove north toward the
main Missouri and remain there, it would open up an immense region for mining
and agriculture which cannot be now reached. They would be in a fine buffalo
country, and out of the way of collisions with the whites, which are always liable
to occur if they are near together. It would also separate them from the southern
Indians, and prevent the plotting and combining which now exists between them.
There are two points I would respectfully indicate as suitable locations for
the posts spoken of, one about the head of the Little Missouri of the Mandans
near the Three Buttes, and the other at some proper place on Powder River. An
expedition starting from the Missouri near Fort Pierre and following the old
traders' trail west of the forks of the Cheyenne, thence to the head of the Little
Missouri of the Mandans, thence to Powder River, would be joined at some proper
post by another from Fort Laramie, and if sufficient force it could hardly fail
to accomplish its object.
I am, captain, your very obedient servant, -.
WM. O. COLLINS, Lieut. Col. Eleventh Ohio Vol. Cav., Comdg. Western Sub-District.
Capt. JOHN PRATT,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Nebraska.
[The War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,
Series I, Vol. 48, Part 1. Pg 92-98].
William H. HARTSHORN and Maria L WILLIAMS were married on 10 Apr 1852 in Ross
Co., Ohio. William H. HARTSHORN and Maria
L WILLIAMS had the following children:
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